About the Firms' Tendency to Cluster by Kultti, Klaus
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Discussion Papers
About the Firms' Tendency to Cluster
Klaus Kultti
University of Helsinki and HECER
Discussion Paper No. 151
February 2007
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No. 151
About the Firms' Tendency to Cluster*
Abstract
I study an economy with sellers and buyers. The sellers are capacity constrained and face
stochastic demand. They have a choice of locating geographically close to each other, i.e.,
clustering or locating separately. In the former case the buyers can visit any of them while
in the latter case the buyers can visit only one of them. The sellers post prices which are
observed by the buyers who base their decision to contact sellers on the prices. I explicitly
derive the equilibrium prices or price strategies in the clustered and in the non-clustered
market for an arbitrary distribution of demand. I show that the clustered market often yields
higher profits than the non-clustered. Finally, I derive the equilibrium market structure.
JEL Classification: D40, D43, L10, L11, C78
Keywords: Clustering, non-cooperative pricing, demand uncertainty.
Klaus Kultti
Department of Economics
University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)
FI-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND
e-mail: klaus.kultti@helsinki.fi
* I thank Matti Liski and Juuso Välimäki for comments.
1 Introduction
It is well known that often competitors locate close to each other. Examples
abound from petrol stations and market places where sellers of similar goods are
side by side to shopping centres where …rms specialising in very close substitutes,
say outdoor equipment, gather in the same part of the centre. This is somewhat
strange as it seems to foster competition.1 Indeed, with symmetric …rms and
constant marginal costs Bertrand competition leads to zero pro…ts.
To explain the phenomenon the standard setting of Bertrand competition
must be altered. I introduce two extra features. The …rst one concerns capacity.
While in the standard setting the …rms are assumed to possess capacity up to the
competitive level I assume that the …rms are capacity constrained. This makes
the …rms’ pricing and location choices non-trivial. The other crucial feature
concerns demand. I assume that the demand is stochastic, and that …rms learn
about it only after they have made the pricing decisions.
Of particular interest is the e¤ect of the …rms’ location choices and demand
uncertainty on the intensity of competition. With limited capacity and stochas-
tic demand the …rms face a trade-o¤ between clustering close to each other and
choosing separate locations. In the former case they compete …ercely when de-
mand is less than supply but when demand is greater than supply the …rms can
price like monopolists. When the …rms are located separately they have to com-
pete for buyers no matter how large the demand; when buyers use symmetric
strategies they contact the …rms randomly, in an un-coordinated manner, and
it is always possible that a …rm remains without any buyers. As the …rms do
not know the level of demand their pricing strategies re‡ect their expectations
about the degree of competition.
Uncertain demand is crucial here since if it were known that there are more
buyers than …rms, the …rms would certainly cluster; they could charge the
monopoly price, and all of them would succeed in trading. Conversely, if it were
known that there are fewer buyers than …rms, the …rms certainly would not clus-
ter; locating in separate locations would save them from Bertrand-competition
and zero pro…ts.
The aim of this article is to demonstrate exactly how the trade-o¤ above
a¤ects location, pricing and pro…ts. To make the point as clear as possible I
assume that the …rms provide homogeneous goods, possess unit-capacity, and
compete in prices before the magnitude of the demand is known. I explicitly
model the price formation process as a non-cooperative activity, and I derive
the equilibrium pricing strategies both when the …rms are clustered and when
they are non-clustered. Further, I assume that the buyers are perfectly informed
about the prices o¤ered by the …rms.
Apriori it is not clear that the …rms should either all cluster together or
locate separately from each other, and I allow for any mixture of these choices.
1An obvious guess is that locating close to each other helps collusion. Addressing collusion
requires a dynamic framework, while here I focus on a phenomenon that comes up also in a
static setting.
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The main result of the article concerns the equilibrium market structure. It tells
how the …rms locate and price in the market taking into account the buyers’
reactions to the prices and to the …rms’ location choices. This is non-trivial since
a good outcome from the …rms’ perspective tends to be a bad outcome from the
buyers’ perspective. Understanding market structure is important since there
is no immediate reason why the market as such should be e¢cient.
The literature closest to this work consist of Stahl (1983) and Wolinsky
(1983) as well as Dudey (1990). Stahl and Wolinsky study how the sellers’
location choices a¤ect the consumers’ search decision when the consumers do
not know the prices. They …nd that clustering may be a pro…table strategy to
the sellers; because of search costs the consumers …nd clusters more desirable
than geographically separated sellers.
Dudey retains the feature that consumers do not know prices but he models
the price formation stage carefully. The consumers expect higher degree of com-
petition and lower prices in clusters, and thus clusters attract more consumers
than sellers who are separated. In equilibrium the consumers’ expectations
about prices turn out true.
Dana (1993) recognises the importance of demand uncertainty but his inter-
est is in the associated price dispersion. In his model capacity is costly, and the
sellers set prices before the demand is known. The sellers then choose a menu
of prices and the quantity to be sold at each price in the menu.
Deneckere and Peck (1995) study a situation with a …nite number of non-
clustered …rms and a continuum of buyers. Demand is uncertain like in my
present model, and the …rms choose capacity. The authors derive the equi-
librium prices and capacities in a symmetric equilibrium. Given the level of
demand the assumption about a …nite number of …rms gets rid of uncertainty
about the number of buyers while in the present model with a continuum of
…rms this uncertainty still remains in the non-clustered market. Deneckere and
Peck do not address the location choices of the …rms at all.
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) study the equilibrium price posting in a
…nite agent deterministic world that corresponds to the non-clustered market
in this article. They note that when some …rms have one unit and the rest of
the …rms have two units for sale the equilibrium prices of the higher capacity
…rms are higher. This means that more capacity per location is regarded as
attractive by the buyers. But it is not obvious what happens when the capacity
is o¤ered by competing …rms rather than one …rm. A complete solution to this
problem when prices are determined by auction, rather than price posting, and
when there are fewer buyers than sellers is given in Kultti (2003a).
In the older literature already Chamberlin (1933) realised the trade-o¤ be-
tween increased competition from locating close to each other and the positive
e¤ect this has on attracting consumers.
Methodologically the work here belongs to the directed search literature
where …rms are dispersed. By posting prices …rms attract buyers. The driving
force is the buyers’ uncoordinated decisions about which …rm to visit, which
then may result locally in under or over demand. The seminal work is by Peters
(1984, 1991) where he shows the existence of the equilibrium, and provides
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the foundation for the urn-ball matching technology with an in…nite number of
agents.
The article is organised as follows. In section 2 I present an example that
makes the trade-o¤ between clustering and not clustering clear. In section 3 I
generalise the example to an in…nite agent model where the demand follows an
arbitrary distribution. In section 4 I take also the buyers’ reactions into account
and determine the equilibrium market structure. In section 5 I take up some
caveats and in section 6 I summarise.
2 A motivating example
Even though this is intended just as an illustrating example I think that it is of
independent interest and provides a rather neat result. Assume that there are
two …rms 1 and 2. The …rms are capacity constrained with zero marginal costs.
Both …rms possess one unit of a good for sale both goods being identical. There
are potential buyers each of whom demands one unit of a good from which he
obtains one unit of utility. The demand is uncertain: With probability ?1 there
is only one buyer, with probability ?2 there are two buyers and with probability
1 ¡ ?1 ¡ ?2 there are three buyers.
I consider two scenarios or di¤erent market structures. In the …rst one the
…rms are physically separated so that the buyers can visit only one of them.
The …rms post prices to attract buyers, and I determine the equilibrium prices.
This is called the non-clustered market
In the second scenario the …rms are located in the same place so that buyers
can visit both of them. The …rms again post prices to attract buyers. This is
called the clustered market.
There is a di¤erence in the …rms’ pricing strategies in the two cases. In the
non-clustered market there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies, i.e., both …rms post the same price. In the clustered market the unique
symmetric strategy is a mixed strategy that is continuous on a closed interval.
2.1 Non-clustered market
First I derive the equilibrium price when the …rms are not clustered. Denote
the price of …rm 1 by ?1 and that of …rm 2 by ?2. Denote the probability that
any buyer goes to …rm 1 by ?1. To determine how the pricing decisions of the
…rms a¤ect the buyers’ probability of contacting them note that in equilibrium
any buyer must be indi¤erent between visiting …rm 1 and …rm 2. When the
buyers’ actions are unco-ordinated they face a trade-o¤ between low prices and
the probability of acquiring a good. A buyer must assess the probability that
the demand is one, two and three given the information that he (the buyer)
exists. Assuming that each buyer is alike one gets the following probabilities by
symmetry
?1 =
1
3
?1
1
3
?1 + 23?2 + (1 ¡ ?1 ¡ ?2)
=
?1
3 ¡ 2?1 ¡ ?2 (1)
3
?2 =
2?2
3 ¡ 2?1 ¡ ?2 (2)
?3 =
3 (1 ¡ ?1 ¡ ?2)
3 ¡ 2?1 ¡ ?2 (3)
where ?? is the updated probability that the demand is ?.
A buyer’s expected utility of visiting …rm 1 is given by
?1 (1 ¡ ?1) + ?2?1
2
(1 ¡ ?1) + ?2 (1 ¡ ?1) (1 ¡ ?1) + (4)
?3
?21
3
(1 ¡ ?1) + ?3 2?1 (1 ¡ ?1)
2
(1 ¡ ?1) +
?3 (1 ¡ ?1)2 (1 ¡ ?1)
Analogously, the expected utility of contacting …rm 2 is given by
?1 (1 ¡ ?2) + ?2?1 (1 ¡ ?2) + ?2 1 ¡ ?1
2
(1 ¡ ?2) + (5)
?3?21 (1 ¡ ?2) + ?3
2?1 (1 ¡ ?1)
2
(1 ¡ ?2) +
?3
(1 ¡ ?1)2
3
(1 ¡ ?2)
Equating (4) and (5) determines the buyers’ behaviour, i.e., determines the
value of ?1 given the posted prices ?1 and ?2. In the symmetric equilibrium both
…rms post price ?1 = ?2 = ?, and then the buyers visit each …rm with equal
probability. Totally di¤erentiating the equality and inserting the equilibrium
conditions yields the following expression
??1
??1
= ¡ 12?1 + 9?2 + ?3
(1 ¡ ?) [12?2 + 16?3] (6)
…rm 1’s problem is the following
max
?1
?1?1?1 + ?2
³
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ?1)2
´
?1 + (1 ¡ ?1 ¡ ?2)
³
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ?1)3
´
?1 (7)
In the …rst term, with probability ?1 there is only one buyer and with probability
?1 he comes to …rm 1. In the second term, with probability ?2 there are two
buyers and at least one of them comes to …rm 1 if it is not the case that both
of them go to the …rm 2. This happens with probability with
³
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ?1)2
´
.
The third term is interpreted analogously. Evaluating the …rst order condition
of this problem at the symmetric equilibrium where ?1 = ?2 = ? and ?1 = 12
yields the following quite nasty looking expression for the equilibrium price
? =
(12?2 + 16?3) (4?1 + 6?2 + 7?3)
(12?2 + 16?3) (4?1 + 6?2 + 7?3) + (12?1 + 9?2 + 7?3) (8?1 + 8?2 + 6?3)
(8)
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It is readily seen that this is always between zero and unity.
The expected utility of a …rm is the probability that it makes a sale times
the price, i.e.,
?
4?1 + 6?2 + 7?3
8
(9)
2.2 Clustered market
Assume that the …rms are located so close to each other that the consumers
are able to visit both of them. As long as 1 ? ?1 ? 0 the …rms’ pricing in a
symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Denote this strategy by ? and
assume that its support is a closed interval [?? ?]. It is immediately clear that
? = 1 since the …rm that chooses ? only makes a sale if at least two buyers
appear and then it is not optimal to leave any surplus to the buyers. The …rm
quoting price ? = 1 makes a sale with probability 1 ¡ ?1 and this is also its
expected utility. The …rm quoting price ? makes a sale for certain (when the
other …rm follows the equilibrium strategy). To get the same expected utility
as a …rm with price unity it must be the case that ? = 1 ¡ ?1. If a …rm posts
price ? 2 (?? ?) its expected utility is given by
?1 (1 ¡ ? (?)) ?+ (1 ¡ ?1) ? (10)
This choice, too, must yield utility 1 ¡ ?1 from which the equilibrium strategy
can be solved
? (?) =
?¡ 1 + ?1
??1
(11)
Proposition 1 Whenever 1 ? ?1 ? 0 the expected utility of the …rms is higher
in the clustered market than in the non-clustered market.
Proof. Straightforward calculation.
The heuristics of the result emanate from the trade-o¤ between being able
to price like a monopolist and being forced to engage in Bertrand-competition.
When the …rms are not clustered the ex-ante probability of ending up with no
buyer when pricing symmetrically is 12?1 +
1
4?2 +
1
8 (1 ¡ ?1 ¡ ?2), while when
they are clustered it is 1
2
?1. The higher probability in the non-clustered market
induces the …rms to engage in more severe price competition to attract buyers.2
3 The general case
3.1 The set up
2As the buyers take into account the probability of getting the good this is not a complete
explanation.
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What we can infer from the example in the previous section is that if the highest
realisations of the (stochastic) demand are su¢ciently larger than the supply
then the …rms …nd it optimal to cluster. The exact magnitude, however, remains
unclear because demand of two or three is 100% or 150% of the supply (which
is two in the example). To derive sharper results I consider a limit economy
where the measure of …rms is unity and the measure of buyers, ?, is distributed
according to a distribution function ? on an interval [0? ?], ? ? 1. For sim-
plicity, but with no loss in generality as to the results, I assume that there are
no atoms.
I conduct similar analysis as in the example, and to that end I need a buyer’s
expectation that there are exactly ? 2 [0??] buyers. By symmetry the updated
probability is given by
?(?) =
?
??(?)R?
0
?
??(?)??
=
??(?)
?(?)
(12)
Notice that this cannot be accomplished by iid random variables but this causes
no problems as the agents are anonymous.
The timing of the model is such that …rst …rms simultaneously quote prices,
then buyers observe the prices and based on these they simultaneously approach
the …rms. To place the comparison of the markets on an equal footing I focus
on symmetric equilibrium in both markets; in the clustered market this means
pricing in mixed strategies, while in the non-clustered market pricing is in pure
strategies.
De…nition 2 A symmetric equilibrium in a particular market consists of sym-
metric pricing strategies of the …rms, and symmetric contact strategies of the
buyers such that any …rm’s strategy is the best response to the other …rms’ and
buyers’ strategies, and any buyer’s strategy is the best response to the …rms
strategies and other buyers’ strategies.
3.1.1 Non-clustered market
The …rms quote prices and the buyers contact the …rms using a symmetric
mixed strategy. Thus, if all …rms quote the same price the number of buyers
a …rm expects is Poisson-distributed with parameter #?? y???#????? =
?
1 = ?. The
probability that a …rm meets exactly ? buyers is ?¡? ?
?
?! .
3
Denote the equilibrium price by ?. Any …rm is of measure zero and the
criterion for the Nash-equilibrium is very weak. To determine ? I assume that
proportion ? of the …rms deviate and quote price e?. Then I impose the equilib-
rium condition that e? = ?. When ? approaches zero this technique yields the
equilibrium price that is the limit of the equilibrium price in the …nite agent
model (eg. Kultti 2003b, Burdett, Shi and Wright 2001).
3The Poisson-distribution is the limit of the binomial distribution when the numbers of
buyers and sellers go to in…nity so that the ratio remains constant.
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Now the buyers’ equilibrium strategy is to mix between going to a deviating
…rm and a non-deviating …rm. With probability ? a buyer goes to a deviating
…rm and with probability 1¡ ? to a non-deviating …rm. Then the Poisson-rates
that govern the meetings of the buyers and the non-deviating …rms is
? =
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?? (13)
and the corresponding rate for the buyers and deviating …rms is
? =
?
?
? (14)
Notice that they are ex-post rates in the sense that they are true once the
magnitude of demand has realised. The agents, however, do not know the real
demand and they behave on expectations.
Given the demand ? and ? the probability that a buyer gets a good isP1
?=0 ?
¡? ??
?!
1
?+1 =
1¡?¡?
? . Thus, the utility of going to a non-deviating …rm isZ ?
0
(1 ¡ ?)1 ¡ ?
¡?
?
?(?)?? (15)
and the utility of going to a deviator isZ ?
0
(1 ¡ e?)1 ¡ ?¡?
?
?(?)?? (16)
In equilibrium these have to be equal. This equality determines ? but for our
purposes it is su¢cient to totally di¤erentiate it to get
??
?e? = ¡
R?
0
1¡?¡?
? ?(?)??R?
0
(1 ¡ ?)1¡?¡?¡??¡??2 ?1¡??(?)?? +
R?
0
(1 ¡ e?)1¡?¡?¡??¡??2 ???(?)??
(17)
The objective of a deviating …rm can be expressed as
maxe?
Z ?
0
e? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢?(?)?? (18)
The …rst order condition for a maximum isZ ?
0
µ
1 ¡ ?¡? + e??¡? ?
?
??
?e?
¶
?(?)?? = 0 (19)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium e? = ? and ? = ? = ?. Inserting these data
into (17) and (19) and letting ? approach zero the equilibrium price turns out
? =
R?
0
¡
1 ¡ ?¡? ¡ ??¡?¢?(?)??R?
0
(1 ¡ ?¡?)?(?)?? (20)
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3.1.2 Clustered market
Just like in the example above it is clear that the …rms’ equilibrium pricing
strategy is mixing. It is also immediate that if the mixed strategy is given by
distribution function ? on [?? ?] then ? = 1, ? has no atoms and no gaps, and
? = 1 ¡?(1).
3.2 Expected pro…ts
A …rm in the clustered market earns 1 ¡?(1) in expected pro…ts. In the non-
clustered market a …rm earns
R?
0
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ??(?)?? where ? is the equilibrium
price given in (20). The former is greater than the latter if
?¡?(1 +?) +
Z ?
0
??¡??(?)?? ? ?(1) (21)
where I have partially integrated the expected pro…t in the non-clustered market.
Based on this, one can state the following result.
Proposition 3 If the probability that there are at most as many buyers as sell-
ers, here unity, is su¢ciently small, i.e., ?¡?(1 +?)+
R?
0
??¡??(?)?? ? ?(1)
then the …rms fare better in the clustered market than in the non-clustered mar-
ket.
To get some idea about the required magnitudes note that if ? is, for in-
stance, uniform on [0??] the condition becomes
?¡?(2 +?) ? 1 (22)
and this is satis…ed for all ? ? 1?11.
4 Equilibrium degree of clustering
Above I have shown that far from being an unreasonable outcome it seems
quite possible that …rms rather cluster together than remain in separate loca-
tions when there is demand uncertainty. The analysis is, however, incomplete
and one-sided. It remains silent about the buyers’ reactions to the …rms’ loca-
tion choices as well as about the …rms’ incentives; if all the …rms are clustered
together could it be the case that an individual …rm would have an incentive to
depart to a separate location. Or if all the …rms are in separate locations does an
individual …rm have an incentive to move together with another …rm? Both the
buyers’ and …rms’ interests have to be taken into account since a market that
is very favourable to, say, the …rms is likely to be unfavourable to the buyers.
Proper analysis requires that the whole market structure must be deter-
mined in equilibrium, and I assume that a non-clustered and a clustered market
may coexist. The timing of the model with two markets is such that …rst the
…rms choose which market to go to, then the buyers choose which market to
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go to anticipating the …rms’ pricing strategies in each market, then the …rms
post prices, and …nally the buyers choose the …rms they contact based on the
observed prices.4 If there is an equilibrium with two markets the buyers must
be indi¤erent between going to either market. Analogously, the …rms must be
indi¤erent between the markets as well.
De…nition 4 An equilibrium consists of …rms choice of market, the …rms sym-
metric pricing strategies in each market, the buyers choice of the market, and
the symmetric contact strategies of the buyers in each market such that any
…rm’s strategy is the best response to the other …rms and buyers strategies, and
any buyer’s strategy is the best response to the …rms strategies and other buyers
strategies.
I …x the proportion of …rms that form the non-clustered market at ?. The
rest of the …rms form the clustered market. Of the buyers proportion ? goes
to the former market where the Poisson-rate governing the meetings is ? = ??? .
The rest of the buyers go to the latter market. From the previous section it is
known that the equilibrium price in the non-clustered market is given by
? =
R?
0
(1 ¡ ?¡? ¡ ??¡?)?(?)??R?
0
(1 ¡ ?¡?)?(?)?? (23)
and the expected utility of a buyer byZ ?
0
1 ¡ ?¡?
?
?(?)??(1 ¡ ?)
=
Z ?
0
1 ¡ ?¡?
?
?(?)??
R?
0 ??
¡??(?)??R?
0 (1 ¡ ?¡?)?(?)??
(24)
=
1
?(?)
Z ?
0
??¡??(?)??
In the clustered market the highest value in the support of the …rms’ mixed
strategy is unity. Let ? denote the mixed strategy; ? (?) denotes the measure
of …rms that post a price at most ?. Since the measure of …rms in the clustered
market is 1 ¡ ? we have ? (1) = 1 ¡ ?. The support of ? is
h
1 ¡?(1¡?
1¡? )? 1
i
.
The lower bound is got as before; proportion 1¡ ? of buyers go to the clustered
market and if the demand is exactly 1¡?1¡? then the measure of buyers exactly
matches the measure of …rms. The mixed strategy ? (?) is determined byµ
1 ¡?
µ
? (?)
1 ¡ ?
¶¶
? = 1 ¡?
µ
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?
¶
(25)
On the left hand side there is the probability that at a …rm quoting price ? makes
a sale and on the right hand side there is the probability that more than 1 ¡ ?
4Since there is an in…nite number of agents we could as well assume that the buyers choose
the market after they have observed all the prices quoted by all the sellers in both markets.
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buyers appear which also equals the expected utility from posting the highest
price, namely unity. From this an explicit expression for ? can be determined
? (?) = (1 ¡ ?)?¡1
0@1 ¡ 1 ¡?
³
1¡?
1¡?
´
?
1A (26)
A buyer’s utility depends on how many other buyers appear. If there are fewer
buyers than …rms, i.e.if (1 ¡ ?)? ? 1 ¡ ? each buyer gets a good and the
…rms that price highest do not sell. If there are more buyers than …rms, i.e.if
(1 ¡ ?)? ¸ 1 ¡ ? then the buyers are rationed so that each of them gets a good
with the same probability. Let ? be the highest price at which trading takes
place. It is given by ? (?) = min f1 ¡ ?? (1 ¡ ?)?g. I can now express the utility
of a buyer as Z (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
?(?)
Z ?¡1((1¡?)?)
1¡?( 1¡?1¡? )
(1 ¡ ?) ?(?)
1 ¡ ? ????
+
Z ?
(1¡?)?(1¡?)
?(?)
1 ¡ ?
?(1 ¡ ?)
Z 1
1¡?( 1¡?1¡? )
(1 ¡ ?) ?(?)
1 ¡ ? ???? (27)
where the …rst term depicts low demand such that all the buyers get a good,
and the second term high demand where the buyers are rationed.
This is a complicated expression, and a more convenient approach can be
used when, as it is the case, the agents’ utilities are linear. Assume that each
…rm charges price ?. A …rm’s expected utility is then given byZ (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
?(1 ¡ ?)
1 ¡ ? ??(?)?? +
Z ?
(1¡?)?(1¡?)
??(?)?? (28)
Forcing this to equal the …rms’ expected utility 1 ¡ ?
³
1¡?
1¡?
´
in the clustered
market I can solve for the price ? that yields the same utility to the …rms as the
mixed strategy ? . This turns out
? =
1 ¡?
³
1¡?
1¡?
´
1 ¡ R (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
1¡?
1¡??(?)??
(29)
Since the total number of trades is the same under mixed strategy ? and
under the scenario where the …rms charge ? the buyers’ expected utility has to
be the same, too, under the two scenarios. Price ? in (29) yields a buyer the
following utilityZ (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
(1 ¡ ?)?(?)?? +
Z ?
(1¡?)?(1¡?)
1 ¡ ?
?(1 ¡ ?)(1 ¡ ?)?(?)?? (30)
=
1
?(?)
"
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ? ?
µ
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?
¶
¡
Z (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
?(?)??
#
(31)
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If there is an equilibrium where some …rms are in the clustered and some
in the non-clustered market the buyers must fare equally well in both markets.
This means that"
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ? ?
µ
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?
¶
¡
Z (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
?(?)??
#
=
Z ?
0
??¡??(?)?? (32)
This is equivalent toZ (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
??(?)?? =
Z ?
0
??¡??(?)?? (33)
Lemma 5 When the buyers are indi¤erent between the markets, the …rms in
the clustered market fare better than the …rms in the non-clustered market orZ ?
0
(?¡? + ??¡?)?(?)?? ? ?
µ
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?
¶
(34)
Proof. Using (33), expression (34) is equivalent toZ ?
0
?¡??(?)?? +
Z (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
?
?
??(?)?? ? ?
µ
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?
¶
=
Z (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
?(?)??
(35)
This is equivalent toZ (1¡?)?(1¡?)
0
³ ?
?
? ¡ 1 + ?¡ ?? ?
´
?(?)??+
Z ?
(1¡?)?(1¡?)
?¡??(?)?? ? 0 (36)
which certainly holds as the …rst integrand is of the form ?¡ 1 + ?¡? ¸ 0.
The above Lemma implies the …rst of the two main results of this article.
Proposition 6 There are two equilibria in the model, namely one where all the
…rms are clustered, and one where all the …rms are non-clustered. In particular,
in equilibrium the two markets do not co-exist.
This result does not depend very much on the demand being stochastic. To
see this assume that there are more …rms than buyers in the market, and that
half the …rms are in each market. Then the …rms in the clustered market make
zero pro…ts because of Bertrand competition, while in the non-clustered market
they make positive pro…ts. The buyers strictly prefer the clustered market
to the non-clustered market. To make buyers indi¤erent between the markets
requires that the ratio of buyers to …rms goes up in the clustered market. But
then the …rms would prefer the clustered market where they can charge the
monopoly price. Of course, with deterministic demand the …rms would not
price as with stochastic demand, and the above heuristics just show that the
buyers’ indi¤erence between the markets makes the clustered market, in an
informal sense, more attractive to the …rms; the stochastic demand allows to
me to formalise this idea.
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Proposition (6) says that there are two equilibria: Either the …rms cluster
together or all the …rms are non-clustered. But it is clear that the non-clustered
equilibrium does not survive standard re…nements, say, trembling-hand perfect-
ness. If the …rms make mistakes with a small probability when they try to
locate as in a non-clustered equilibrium a non-zero measure of them end up in
a clustered market. Then the buyers’ optimal contact decisions are such that
they are indi¤erent between the markets, and by Proposition (6) the sellers in
the clustered market fare better. This reasoning shows the second main result
Proposition 7 The clustered market is the unique perfect equilibrium.
5 Caveats
5.1 Capacity
Perhaps the weakest point in the modelling so far is the assumption about
exogenous capacity. One would expect that the nature of competition and
pro…tability in a market a¤ect the capacity choice of the …rms. It turns out
to be di¢cult to determine the Nash-equilibrium level of capacity even with
constant unit costs; given the capacity the equilibrium prices can be determined
in the same vein as above, though. Some insights to the problem can be attained
by assuming free entry of the …rms. Typically it is assumed that entry drives
pro…ts to zero but that approach is not compatible with the adjustment process
of the previous section. From proposition 3 it is known that when both markets
co-exist, and the buyers choose which market to go to optimally, the clustered
market is more pro…table to the …rms than the non-clustered market. Thus, the
pro…ts in both markets cannot equal zero simultaneously.
Instead of applying the free entry to the adjustment process I determine
the welfare under both market structures with free entry, and I also determine
the socially optimal number of …rms. Consider …rst the clustered market, and
denote the number of …rms there by ?? . Now the expected pro…t of a …rm
entering the market is 1 ¡?(??) ¡ ? where ? is the entry cost to the market.
The expected number of transactions isZ ??
0
??(?)?? + ??
Z ?
??
?(?)?? = ?? ¡
Z ??
0
?(?)?? (37)
where I have partially integrated. The total welfare is then
?? ¡
Z ??
0
?(?)?? ¡ ??? (38)
The socially optimal number of …rms is got from the …rst order condition
1 ¡ ? ¡?(??) = 0 (39)
But this is the same as the free entry condition above. Thus, free entry guar-
antees the socially optimal number of …rms in the clustered market.
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In the non-clustered market the number of …rms is denoted by ?? , and the
Poisson parameter governing the meetings is denoted by ? ´ ??? . An entering
…rm’s zero-pro…t condition isZ ?
0
¡
1 ¡ ?¡? ¡ ??¡?¢?(?)?? ¡ ? (40)
The number of transactions in the non-clustered market is given byZ ?
0
??
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢?(?)?? (41)
and total welfare is given byZ ?
0
??
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢?(?)?? ¡ ??? (42)
The …rst order condition for the optimal number of …rms, after some manipu-
lation, simpli…es to Z ?
0
¡
1 ¡ ?¡? ¡ ??¡?¢?(?)?? ¡ ? (43)
which is exactly the same as the free-entry condition. This means that in both
markets the meetings and terms of trade are determined in an e¢cient manner
given the market structure.5
Inserting the free-entry conditions to the expressions for total welfare yields
in the clustered market
??? (??) ¡
Z ??
0
?(?)??
and in the non-clustered market
??
Z ?
0
??¡??(?)??
These expressions are just the buyers’ aggregate utilities in the two markets
(…rms make zero pro…ts).
I can now utilise the following trick to determine which magnitude is greater.
Assume that the buyers do not adapt but half of them go to the non-clustered
market and half of them go to the clustered market. Assume also that the
5 It is known that the non-clustered market with deterministic demand and price posting
is utilitywise equivalent to a non-clustered market where the buyers randomly contact the
sellers, and the terms of trade are determined in an auction. The auction is such that in a
one-seller-one-buyer meeting the initiator of the contact, here the buyer, makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er, and in a one-seller-many-buyer meeting the buyers bid for the object. This,
also known as the Mortensen-rule, is the correct way to distribute bargaining power to attain
e¢cienct entry (see Julian, Kennes and King, 2006). In the clustered market all possible
trades take place, and e¢cient entry is not surprising at all.
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number of buyers is doubled, i.e., the density of bueyrs is ?(?) ´ ?(??2) where
? 2 [0? 2?]. Then the clustered and non-clustered markets are as above, and
…rms fare equally well. But from proposition (5) it is known that if the buyers
fare equally well then the …rms in the clustered market fare better than the
sellers in the non-clustered market. Thus, if the …rms fare equally well there
must be more buyers in the non-clustered market than in the case where the
buyers are indi¤erent between the markets. This means that the buyers’ utility
in the non-clustered market is lower than in the clustered market. As I assumed
that there are equal numbers of buyers in both markets this means that the
welfare in the non-clustered market is lower than in the clustered market when
there is free entry of …rms.
5.2 Degree of clustering
Another feature that may raise doubts is that the …rms are assumed to be either
completely clustered or completely separated so that there is just one …rm per
location. One may expect that in some circumstances con…gurations where
there are many locations occupied by ? ¸ 2 …rms would feature the optimal
degree of clustering. This possibility would complicate the analysis very much
but it would most likely not contribute much to our understanding. The reason
is that all con…gurations where there are a positive number of …rms in a location
constitute an ine¢cienct market as it is possible that no buyers contact some
locations while some other locations are contacted by more buyers than there
are sellers in the location. If the clustered market and a market with several
…rms in a location coexisted the former one, which is e¢cient, would still yield
higher pro…ts to the …rms given that the buyers are indi¤erent between the
markets.
6 Conclusion
I study two market structures under capacity constrained …rms and demand
uncertainty. In one market the …rms are geographically separated so that a buyer
can visit only one …rm. The …rms attract buyers by posting prices, and I derive
the unique equilibrium price. In the other market the …rms are geographically
close to each other so that a buyer can choose the most attractive …rm. In this
market the …rms attract buyers by posting prices, too. The unique symmetric
equilibrium pricing strategy is a mixed strategy. I derive this explicitly.
Comparing the …rms’ expected utilities in the two markets shows that they
prefer the clustered market if the demand variability is large. It is not, however,
enough to take into account only one side of the market. The buyers choose
which …rms to visit, and to determine the relative attractiveness of the two
markets it is necessary to allow both kind of markets to co-exist. The behaviour
of the buyers is then such that some of them go to one market and the others
to the other market, and in equilibrium they have to be indi¤erent. But it
turns out that then the case for the clustered market is even stronger; whenever
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the buyers are indi¤erent between the markets the …rms necessarily prefer the
clustered market. This means that if there is a dynamic adjustement process in
the economy there is a tendency towards the clustered market.
The reason for the …rms to prefer the clustered market is that in the non-
clustered market they compete for the buyers whatever the demand; indeed, it
is possible that some …rms do not meet any buyers even though there are more
buyers than …rms. In the clustered market the …rms make a transaction with
probability one in such cases, and they only compete for the buyers when there
are fewer buyers than …rms. Thus, the competition is less …erce in the clustered
market.
If there are two markets and the buyers are indi¤erent between them, then
the …rms fare better in the clustered market because it is e¢cient. There all
the possible trades are always executed. This fact is behind the stability of the
clustered market when replicator dynamics is used to select between the two
equilibria.
For the results of this work it is essential that there is demand variability
and that there is a positive probability for excess demand, i.e, more buyers than
…rms. If it is certain that the number of buyers is less than the number of …rms
then the …rms do not want to cluster since in equilibrium they would earn zero
pro…ts as a result of Bertrand-competition. I have determined the equilibrium
market structure in this case in Kultti (2003a).
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